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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES
RULE 601: GENERAL RULE OF COMPETENCY
Federal Rule of Evidence 601 states:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency
of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law. 1
The enactment of Rule 601 abolished the federal common law
that a witness should be disqualified based upon general
assumptions of incompetence. Prior to the enactment of Rule
601, disabilities such as infancy, religious beliefs, criminal
convictions, interest in the litigation. insanity, and adversarial
testimony about a decedent may have rendered a witness
incompetent to testify. 2 Rule 601 now establishes a presumption
of competency of all witnesses, 3 with the exception of the "socalled Dead Man's Acts" 4 which are still recognized in many
jurisdictions as exceptions to the general competency rule for all
witnesses. 5 As the rule now exists, the trier of fact. after hearing
the testimony of all the witnesses. is permitted to decide how
much weight should be accorded to the testimony; this is now a
6
question of witness credibility rather than witness competency.
1. FED. R. EviD. 601.
2. See FED. R. EvID. 601 advisory committee's note.
3. See United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 112 t4th Cir. 1984) (stating
that "[u]nder... [R]ule [601] every witness is presumed to be competent").
4. See infra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
5. FED. R. EviD. 601 advisory committee's note. -The Dead Man's Acts
are surviving traces of the common law disqualification of parties and
interested persons." Id. Although there is no federal "Dead Man's Act."
federal courts sitting in diversity will apply a Dead Man's Statute if one exists
under the applicable state law.
6. See United States v. Cook, 949 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1991). "Rule 601
represents the culmination of the modem trend which has converted questions
of competency into questions of credibility while 'steadily moving towards a
realization that judicial determination of the question of whether a witness
should be heard at all should be abrogated in favor of hearing the testimony for
what it is worth.'" Id. at 293 (citation omitted).
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Even prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
7
the United States Supreme Court, in Rosen v. United States,
seemed to be moving away from the stringent common law

position, recognizing that "truth is more likely to be arrived at by
hearing the testimony
understanding ... leaving

of
the

all persons of competent
credit and weight of such

testimony to be determined by the jury or by the court, rather
than by rejecting the witnesses as incompetent ... "8 More
recently, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Roach, 9 held that
Rule 601 did not require an examination of a witness to
determine his or her competency, but rather, the issue is a
question of credibility which is to be tested through crossexamination. 10

In New York, however, the issue of witness competency varies
according to the type of proceeding. In criminal proceedings,
New York's Criminal Procedure Law provides that any person
can be a witness unless the court finds that, due to infancy,
mental disease or defect, he or she does not possess the capacity

or intelligence required of a competent witness. 11 By contrast, in
civil proceedings, a witness is considered to be competent even
where he or she has an interest in the event 12 or where he or she

has been convicted of a crime. 13
7. 245 U.S. 467 (1918) (rejecting the common law rule of witness
disqualification based on a prior criminal conviction).
8. Id. at 471. See also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54 (1987). In
Rock, the Court applied Rosen in holding that a per se rule barring all
hypnotically induced testimony in a criminal case is constitutionally
impermissible. Id. (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918)).
9. 590 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1979).
10. Id. at 186 ("If the court finds the witness otherwise properly qualified,
the witness should be allowed to testify and the defendant given ample
opportunity to impeach his or her perceptions and recollections.").
11. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20(1) (McKinney 1992). Section
60.20(1) states: "Any person may be a witness in a criminal proceeding unless
the court finds that, by reason of infancy or mental disease or defect, he does
not possess sufficient intelligence or capacity to justify the reception of his
evidence." Id.
12. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4512 (McKinney 1992). Section 4512
provides: "Except as otherwise expressly prescribed, a person shall not be
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New York however, has a variety of limitations to the general
rule of competency. For example, New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules [hereinafter C.P.L.R.] section 4502(a) 14 provides a
narrow rule of incompetence in matrimonial actions based on
adultery. 15

Similarly, C.P.L.R. section 4519,16 commonly referred to as
the "Dead Man's Statute," provides an additional exception to
the witness competency rule. 17 The "Dead Man's Statute" is a
codified version of the common law disqualification of
adversarial testimony concerning communications with a

excluded or excused from being a witness, by reason of his interest in the
event or because he is a party or the spouse of a party." Id.
13. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 4513 (McKinney 1992). Section 4513
provides in pertinent part: "A person who has been convicted of a crime is a
competent witness.. .

."

Id.

14. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4502(a) (McKinney 1992). Section 4502(a)
provides: "A husband or wife is not competent to testify against the other in an
action founded upon adultery, except to prove the marriage, disprove the
adultery, or disprove a defense after evidence has been introduced tending to
prove such defense." Id.
15. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4502 practice commentaries. Section 4502
provides three exceptions in an action for adultery. Specifically, "[o]ne spouse
may testify against the other: 1) to prove the marriage, 2) disprove the
adultery, or 3) disprove a defense after evidence in support of the defense has
been introduced." Id. See Marrow v. Marrow, 124 A.D.2d 1000, 508
N.Y.S.2d 789 (4th Dep't 1986).
16. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4519 (McKinney 1992). Section 4519
provides in pertinent part:
Upon the trial of an action or the hearing upon the merits of a special
proceeding, a party or a person interested in the event, or a person
from, through or under whom such a party or interested person derives
his interest or title by assignment or otherwise, shall not be examined as
a witness in his own behalf or interest ... by assignment or otherwise.
concerning a personal transaction or communication between the witness
and the deceased person or mentally ill person ....
Id.
17. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4519 practice commentaries. (-CPLR
4519 and its predecessor statutes have preserved the rule of incompetenc% " Ith
respect to the testimony of an interested person concerning a transactuon Or
communication with a decedent or mentally ill person.-).
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deceased or mentally ill person. 18 The underlying rationale for
this exception is the concern that testimony regarding events and
actions involving a deceased or mentally incompetent person is
not susceptible to verification through cross-examination. 19
Because one of the parties is permanently unable to testify to
either contradict or verify the testimony, as a matter of public
policy, the New York State Legislature has decided that in order
to "achieve adversarial balance in civil trials" by not allowing
testimony that cannot be refuted by the other party to the
transaction. 20 As such, proof of communications between a
deceased person and an interested witness must be proven
21
through documentary evidence.
The "Dead Man's Statute" is frequently invoked in actions to
contest a decedent's will. For instance, in In re Estate of Wood, 22
the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the applicability of the
Dead Man's Statute in New York:23 "One of the main purposes
of the rule was to protect the estate of the deceased from claims
of the living who, through their own perjury, could make factual
assertions which the decedent could not refute in court." 24
In contrast to New York law, Federal Rule 601 abolished the
federal common law notion of a Dead Man's Statute. 25 The Dead
Man's Statute will be used by a federal court only when state law
26
applies in a diversity action.
18. Id.

19. Id. ("Such testimony is considered to be rife with the potential for
perjury because it can be given without fear of contradiction by the other party
to the transaction.").
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 52 N.Y.2d 139, 418 N.E.2d 365, 436 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1981).
23. Id. at 143-44, 418 N.E.2d at 366-67, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52 (stating

that the Dead Man's statute is embodied in statutory law and modification of it
is a matter for the legislature).
24. Id. at 144, 418 N.E.2d at 366-67, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
25. See FED. R. EvID. 601.

26. Id. See, e.g., Stutzman v. CRST, Inc., 997 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1993)
(finding that admission of expert testimony is a substantive issue governed by
state law); Lovejoy Electronics, Inc. v. O'Berto, 873 F.2d 1001, 1005 (7th

Cir. 1989)(holding that "in civil cases 'with respect to an element of a claim or
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In conclusion, the Federal Rules of Evidence allow for a much
broader interpretation of witness competency, relying upon the
finder of fact's ability to weigh testimony in relation to the
credibility of the witness. In contrast, while generally allowing
all competent witnesses to testify, New York law possesses
specific grounds upon which a witness may be disqualified.
Finally, in federal cases where diversity jurisdiction exists, state
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of
a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law'"); Savarese v.
Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that the State's Dead Man's
Statute would not apply to a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Finch v.
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 1426 (6th Cir. 1987) (allowing insured's
widow to testify regarding statements made by her husband in violation of
Tennessee statute because a timely objection was not made); Cipriani v. Sun
Life Ins. Co. of America, 757 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that in a
diversity action, testimony of insured's intent to change beneficiaries on a life
insurance policy was admissible under Pennsylvania's Dead Man's Act where
alleged beneficiary did not represent any interest of the insured); Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.. 411 F.2d 88
(3d Cir. 1969) (finding that it was not necessary to decide the competency of a
witness under the Dead Man's Act although finding that Pennsylvania state law
applied in this diversity action); Spraying Systems Co. v. William G. Smart
Co., Inc., 816 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ili. 1993) (finding that a manufacturer
waived its right to invoke the Illinois Dead Man's Act).
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law grounds for disqualification, such as those in New York.
may limit the liberal interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
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